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Abstract
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is seldom more difficult than during disaster relief efforts. As supply chains quickly form in
response to a disaster, a slow information flow presents a major hindrance to coordinating the allocation of resources
necessary for disaster relief efforts. This paper identifies impediments to the flow of information through supply chains
following large scale and catastrophic disasters. Given the scarce body of literature on this subject, a grounded theory
case study was conducted to examine an extreme case. The study concentrates on the efforts of multiple organizations and
individuals that provided relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which battered the Gulf Coast of the southeastern
United States in late 2005. Data was gathered from diverse sources, including government agencies, profit and non-profit
organizations, and individuals, during and after the disaster. Based on our data analysis, we not only identify information
flow impediments (i.e., inaccessibility, inconsistent data and information formats, inadequate stream of information, low
information priority, source identification difficulty, storage media misalignment, unreliability, and unwillingness), but also
identify likely sources of these impediments, and examine their consequences to organizations’ disaster recovery efforts.
Our findings suggest some potential design principles for devising solutions capable of reducing or alleviating the impact
of information flow impediments in future disasters.
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Information Flow Impediments in Disaster Relief
Supply Chains
1. Introduction
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall near New Orleans on August 29, 2005, it brought winds of 140
mph and near-record storm surges. Communities along the Gulf Coast of the USA from southeast
Louisiana to Alabama were devastated, but more damage was to come. On August 31, Katrina’s
strong storm surges, winds, and continued rainfall in New Orleans began to break the city’s levees.
Much of New Orleans quickly became uninhabitable, as 80 percent of the city and portions of
neighboring parishes flooded. Flooding in most areas did not recede for weeks. In the end, nearly
1,700 people died, and unparalleled masses of people evacuated to neighboring cities and states
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). Houston, Texas, took in an estimated 250,000 evacuees and
managed what is considered to be the largest shelter operation in U.S. history. In just one location
alone—the Reliant Complex, which includes the old Astrodome—Houston city services and
volunteers provided food, housing, and medical care to a total of 24,300 evacuees during the height
of sheltering operations. Over several weeks, roughly 60,000 volunteers helped distribute over USD 7
million in donated goods and services (Harris County Joint Information Center, 2006). The remaining
225,000 evacuees in Houston were scattered throughout the city in other Red Cross shelters, hotels,
informal shelters, and private households of family, friends, or kind strangers who opened their homes.
Despite attempts by organizations and various levels of government to organize Katrina response
and recovery efforts effectively, documented results show that the efforts to provide help where
needed were often inefficient. Poorly coordinated supply chain efforts, for example, led to USD 900
million in manufactured homes and 110 million pounds of ice (60 percent of what was ordered) going
unused by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) while many suffered in desperate
need of housing and relief from the heat (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).
The formation of supply chains following large-scale catastrophic disasters such as Hurricane Katrina
is a complex undertaking. Disaster-driven supply chains form an incident organization, a “temporary
configuration of otherwise disparate resources” (Smith and Dowell, 2000, p. 1154). Within these
impromptu structures that attempt to save lives and restore communities, the need for successful
supply chain management is unparalleled. Supply chain management theories built in non-disaster
environments have shown that the coordination of resource flows, and their related costs, can be
improved by leveraging information flows (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Lee and Whang, 1999). 1
However, fostering information flows among a large collection of previously unrelated organizations in
a post-disaster environment is fraught with difficulty just when the right resources truly need to get to
the right place at the right time.
The objective of our research therefore, is to study information flows in the management of the
disaster relief supply chains that formed following Hurricane Katrina. We accomplish this by
investigating a single, critical instance case, or so-called extreme case (Yin, 2002). This approach
takes advantage of a rich, yet rare, occurrence of a situation that has not received significant research
attention in the SCM and IS fields. We have chosen to apply grounded theory due to the absence of a
strong theoretical background on disaster relief in the existing SCM and IS literature. As the massive
information breakdowns and supply chain disarray in Hurricane Katrina’s wake demonstrated,
adequate response and recovery following large-scale catastrophic disasters remains an elusive goal
(McEntire, 1999, 2002; Stephenson, 2005; Wise, 2006). Studying these post-Katrina phenomena will
help researchers recognize the limitations of the current literature in both the SCM and IS fields when
encountering a disaster environment. With our study, we empirically contribute to an underresearched area and propose theoretical categories of information flow impediments in disaster relief
supply chain management. System developers may particularly benefit from our proposed design
principles when formulating solutions to reduce and even overcome existing information flow
impediments in future disasters.
1

We are not suggesting that information flows are the only problem for coordinating supply chains during
emergencies; however, as the literature shows, it is a major factor (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Lee and Whang,
1999).
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The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide some background on both non-disaster
(henceforth, “normal”) and disaster relief supply chain research. Second, we discuss our extreme
case study research approach in more detail. Third, we present our results, which consist of
theoretical propositions concerning the impediments to information flows that we identified, their
possible causes, and the observed reaction strategies. Fourth, we propose a set of design principles
that future researchers can subject to empirical testing. Moreover, we reflect on the unpredictable
nature of disaster situations and highlight the relevance of improvised human action to solve
problems not considered in existing information systems. We conclude by reflecting on the relevance
of our study and others that may concentrate on this area.

2. Background on Supply Chains in Disasters
The formation or reformation of supply chains following large-scale and catastrophic disasters such
as Hurricane Katrina is a complex undertaking. Established and impromptu organizations and
government agencies, attempting to work together, in some cases for the first time, quickly must
provide goods and services that help save lives, provide comfort, and even restore entire
communities. A supply chain supported by systems that support the flow of information is an
important factor in disaster relief efforts.
Supply chain management literature places considerable emphasis on the relationship between
information flows and the responsiveness or efficiency of resource flows (Sahin and Robinson, 2002;
Chen, 2003). It has long been known that inter-firm management of resource flows and their related
costs are greatly improved by leveraging proper information from supply chain partners to make
better decisions when managing variability and uncertainty (Forrester, 1958; Lee, Padmanabhan, and
Whang, 1997; Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Lewis and Talayevsky, 2004). However, this relationship has
not been specifically investigated within the context of disaster relief where both uncertainty and
variability greatly exceed that found in normal supply chain environments.
Supply chain management in normal environments often focuses on value production within a single
firm for its own benefit or that of its owners (see Kouvelis, Chambers, and Wang, 2006 for a recent
literature survey). Yet, when a major disaster adversely impacts lives and communities, individuals
and organizations often give of their own resources to ensure the overall system adequately serves
those in dire need (Thomas and Fritz, 2006). Managing disaster relief supply chains, then, may
present challenges that are somewhat different from managing normal industry supply chains, as they
require different information flows for different purposes.
Despite both its intriguing uniqueness and its distinct importance to society, research on disaster relief
supply chains is scarce (exceptions are: Beamon and Kotleba, 2006; Denning, 2006; Van
Wassenhove 2006; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Ödzamar et al., 2004; Tomasini and Van
Wassenhove, 2004). The research that does exist helps characterize how these supply chains differ
from their normal industry counterparts; however, it does not explicitly examine the flow of information
between supply chain partners. Nonetheless, when this literature is examined, we find that three
primary themes emerge concerning the unique aspects inherent to disaster relief supply chains that
underscore their need for and difficulty with fostering adequate information flows: urgent
responsiveness, extreme uncertainty, and a short supply chain life-cycle.
Disaster relief supply chains require unparalleled levels of urgent responsiveness when compared to
their normal industry counterparts. The overarching disaster relief supply chain performance criterion
during the response phase is primarily responsiveness, and efficiency is secondary. The public shows
little tolerance for “penny-pinching” when lives are threatened or people remain uprooted from their
homes (Kelly, 1995). Additionally, minimizing the impact of a disaster often means saving lives,
preserving property, and quickly restoring both social and economic foundations. For example, Van
Wassenhove (2006) examines the difficulties of managing humanitarian aid supply chains and notes
that the pressure of time is not just a matter of money, but can mean the difference between life and
death. Similarly, Ödzamar et al. (2004) recognize the need to distribute relief aid rapidly in their
creation of an integrated emergency planning and response decision support system. Therefore, the
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managing of supply chains under these circumstances will depend greatly on having relevant and
timely information.
In addition to time and public pressures, disaster relief supply chains operate under extreme
uncertainty. Beamon and Kotleba (2006), for example, investigate inventory management strategies
applied in emergency relief operations in southern Sudan and note the unique irregularities in size,
timing, and location of relief item demand patterns. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2004, p. 437)
point out that disaster relief functions are unique from normal industries in requiring a supply chain to
be “designed and deployed immediately with limited information about resources available, needs in
the field, quantities required, and a large amount of suppliers (who make unpredictable
contributions).” Similarly, Van Wassenhove (2006) discusses how crucial information for designing
normal industry supply chains, such as time, place, type of product, quantity, and potential supply
sources may not be known when participating organizations are forming new disaster relief supply
chains. Even after relief efforts begin to stabilize, post-disaster environments may remain so large
and dynamic that no single organization can independently create and maintain comprehensive
information concerning the overall relief effort.
Disaster relief supply chains also have very short life-cycles. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) specifically
mention the short and unstable existence of humanitarian aid supply chains when contrasting them to
normal industry. That is, normal supply chains often evolve supplier-buyer relationships over decades
as they refine policies and processes to improve their competitive positions. Investments are often
made to increase resource-flow efficiency by formalizing and automating information flows within
these slowly-changing organizational networks. As Denning (2006) points out, however, disaster relief
supply chains hastily evolve new networks of relationships within days or even hours. Interorganizational policies and processes are rapidly created and modified with little time to formalize or
automate associated information flows before relief efforts subside in a matter of only months.
Furthermore, once relief efforts end, participating organizations have little incentive to continue
maintaining or refining the policies, processes, relationships, and information flows established for
their response to the disaster.
Since both lives and community livelihoods are at stake, there is certainly a need for improving the
responsive flow of resources among organizations participating in disaster relief supply chains.
Supply chain management research asserts that variability and uncertainty can be better managed by
improving information flows, but has not explicitly considered how to foster these information flows in
disaster relief environments or how instrumental they could be in improving relief effort performance.
In practice, several information systems have been implemented with just that goal and still, adequate
system performance in disaster relief supply chains remains elusive (McEntire, 1999, 2002;
Stephenson, 2005; Wise, 2006). It is likely that fostering information flows in a context of urgent
responsiveness, extreme uncertainty, and short supply chain life-cycles presents considerable
difficulties (Manoj and Baker, 2007). Therefore, we seek to contribute empirically to informationrelated supply chain knowledge by providing a case study of information flows in Hurricane Katrina
relief efforts. Theoretically, our research contributes a set of propositions regarding information flow
impediments that exist during disaster relief efforts. We examine how these propositions can serve as
a foundation for designing information systems that enhance disaster relief supply chain performance.

3. Research Method
As the phenomenon being studied represents a complex, yet rare, occurrence of a disaster situation
that has not received significant theoretical research attention in the IS or SCM fields, we chose a
qualitative approach. Qualitative methods have the advantage of supporting a constant comparative
analysis while providing the flexibility for investigating aspects of a phenomenon that may not be
completely identifiable at the outset of the inquiry (Boudreau and Robey, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Klein and Myers, 1999). A large-scale disaster such as Hurricane Katrina represents exactly this—a
situation of extreme and unique conditions, the effects of which are deemed to be incisive while
somewhat erratic. Therefore, we chose a single, critical instance case, or so-called extreme case (Yin,
2002), in order to explore the impact of information flow impediments on the effectiveness of supply
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chain management in disasters. Methodologically, we relied upon a grounded theory approach due to
the absence of a strong theoretical backdrop in the disaster management literature (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Grounded theory provides researchers with the
opportunity to think outside the confines of existing schemas while providing guidelines to approach
the nature of a phenomenon in a structured way. Though rarely applied in the IS and SCM fields, as
compared to other disciplines such as health management, grounded theory has proven its
usefulness through some studies (e.g., Galal, 2001; Schroeder et al., 2008; Urquhart, 1997; Urquhart,
2000).

3.1.

Data Collection

The nature of the study required us to select interviewees that had been exposed to and had firsthand experience of the disaster’s aftermath in terms of information and supply chain management.
Simultaneously, the phenomenon obliged us to strive for a broad and comprehensive spectrum of
experiences, capturing disaster perspectives of both demand and supply. On the demand (or
receiving) side, we were granted access to interview employees of a large defense contractor and a
local university in the New Orleans area. On the supply (or relief-providing) side, we gained
permission to interview a government Emergency Operations Center, a faith-based organization,
chapters of the American Red Cross in both Louisiana and Texas, and four volunteers who were not
employed by any organization, but were selected based on their varied experiences with providing
relief services. Even though the organizations and individuals selected were not all directly linked to
one another, they were related indirectly through the broader disaster relief supply chain network. We
summarize the background of each organization’s relief efforts in the appendix.
Within each organization, we chose interviewees who had interfaced between the strategic and
operational level of the organization to capture the consonance (or dissonance) between plans and
their implementation. We were able to obtain interviews with at least two individuals from each
organization, with the exception of the local university. Table 1 provides a summary of the interviews
conducted.
Table 1: Post-Katrina Data Collection
Site Selection
University of New Orleans
Relief-receiving
(UNO)
organizations
(demand)
Large Defense Contractor
American Red Cross

Relief-providing
organizations
(supply)

Interview Data
1 interview
8 interviews
2 interviews

Interfaith Ministries (IM) for
Greater Houston
Harris County Office of
Homeland Security and
Emergency Management
(OHSEM)
Spontaneous, unaffiliated
volunteers

2 interviews

Archival Data
Online press
releases
Organization
press releases
Online press
releases
Online press
releases

2 interviews

Online press
releases

4 interviews

Personal blogs

Data collection began in November 2005 as Hurricane Katrina relief efforts began stabilizing.
Interestingly, study participants displayed high motivation to contribute to our study, despite—or
perhaps because of—the severe and extraordinary nature of the situation. Interviews were semistructured and lasted an average of 40 minutes each. As an opening question in each interview, we
asked participants to recap the context and facts surrounding their experiences with Hurricane Katrina.
Next, we asked interviewees open-ended questions that allowed them to provide their own
perspectives of the event. If we perceived any ambiguity concerning an interviewee’s statements,
follow-up questions were asked to ascertain the appropriate context and attain better understanding.
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In closing, we asked interviewees to comment on any episodes that were still prevalent in their minds,
but had not been mentioned yet. We recorded and transcribed all interviews.

3.2.

Data Analysis

We analyzed our data using the Strauss and Corbin (1990) coding paradigm, consisting of open, axial,
and selective coding, as it provided a thorough and structured approach for examining the
phenomenon of interest. It should be mentioned that we used the coding scheme as a general
guideline to make sense of our data while remaining alert for emerging themes. We found the coding
helpful for identifying impediments to information flows, their context, their possible origins, and their
consequences. The specific data analysis steps formed a spiral rather than a sequence, described as
follows.
The transcripts of the interviews were subjected to open coding. Open coding is concerned with
identifying and naming the dimensions of the phenomena through the emergence of concepts or
codes. We analyzed interviews on a line-by-line basis and fractured them into codes that summarized
our interpretation of the data. Then, through comparative analysis across interviews and with regard
to similarities and differences, we grouped codes together and formed, where applicable, more
abstract categories or themes.
Axial coding was applied to match codes into the categories of the coding paradigm. Categories of
axial coding are schematically summarized in Table 2. This part of the analysis required us to pay
close attention to linking categories and subcategories while keeping the coding paradigm in mind.
Knowing that some researchers have criticized the coding paradigm due to its tendency to force data
into a pre-fabricated form (Glaser, 1992), we made certain to apply it as a guide instead of as a
dogmatic principle by closely concentrating on emerging themes. We found that the coding paradigm
and its categories fit the overall nature of our data very well—with one exception. Considering the
number of organizations and the variety of diverse incidents that took place in the disaster situation,
we soon realized that the category of intervening conditions was too broadly defined for our purposes.
Therefore, we had to segment this category into multiple pieces, each signifying a different
information flow impediment and its respective action/interaction strategies (as indicated in Figure 1).
Table 2: Axial Coding Dimensions from Strauss and Corbin (1990)
Dimensions

Definition

Causal Conditions

Causal conditions represent a set of events or happenings that influence
the phenomena (p. 131), such as rules, regulations, beliefs, values, etc.

Phenomenon

Addresses the question: What is going on here? (p. 130)

Contextual Conditions

Contextual conditions represent a specific set of conditions (patterns of
conditions) that intersect dimensionally at the time and place to create the
set of circumstances or problems to which persons respond through
actions/interactions. (p. 132)

Intervening Conditions

Conditions that alter or mitigate the impact of causal conditions; they are
unexpected events or factors that result in certain behavior or
action/interaction strategies associated with the phenomena. (p. 131)

Actions/Interaction
Strategies

Purposeful and deliberate acts that are taken to resolve a problem by
individuals or groups to issues, problems, happenings or events that arise
under those conditions, and in so doing, shaping the phenomenon in some
way. (p. 128, 133)

Consequences

Outcomes of actions/interactions, representing what happens as a result of
those actions/interactions or the failure of persons or groups to respond to
situations by actions/interactions, which constitutes an important finding in
and of itself. (p. 128)
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In a last step, and using selective coding, we solidified the model to form theoretical propositions that
provided a coherent picture of the phenomena observed. We accomplished this by cross-validating it
not only against interview data but also against archival data. In a few instances, when we felt that an
interpreted theme might not be tied directly to the accumulated data, we contacted the interviewees to
comment on and clarify these issues. Overall, we finalized the analysis by reaching the status of
“theoretical saturation” (Eisenhardt, 1989). Our selective coding allowed us to develop a theoretical
framework that classifies information flow impediments and identifies strategies that were used to
respond to them. During this phase, we also went a step further to identify possible technical
solutions that might support the observed reaction strategies to each impediment (as will be
discussed later in the Discussion and Table 3).
Figure 1 provides the comprehensive model summary of our data analysis based on the Strauss and
Corbin (1990) coding paradigm. Due to our research objective of identifying information flow
impediments, however, we will focus on specific parts of the model only for the discussion of our
findings, i.e., the phenomenon, the intervening conditions, and the action/interaction strategies.

Figure 1: Coding Analysis of the Phenomenon based on Strauss and Corbin (1990)

4. Results
In this section we present the results of our study. It is divided into two parts. First, we concentrate on
three distinct activities (i.e., collection, sharing, and processing) that we found contributed to the interorganizational flow of information in the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief supply chain. The second
part of the section focuses on eight specific issues that impeded the aforementioned activities.

4.1.

Information Flow Activities and Their Impact on Resource Flows

Organizations were found to be carrying out data collection, information processing, and information
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sharing activities in an effort to improve either their own performance or that of the overall incident
organization. The following quotes from a senior director of emergency services at the American Red
Cross provides illustrations of the three information flow activities and how they are related.
“During disaster assessment, when we actually go in and record what (houses) are
destroyed and what is damaged after disaster, there’s a form to fill out […] On this form you
record if it’s destroyed, major, or minor, what kind of damage. They call it a street sheet,
one sheet per street. […] Then you bring all those sheets back and they have to be
consolidated into a larger sheet so we know what kind of disaster it is. […] Whenever
there’s a disaster anywhere in the state, (the state emergency operations center will) initiate
conference calls. Two a day, usually at 10 and 3. […] You have local decision makers,
majors, judges, etc. […] It’s all about information sharing.”
First, the recording of house damage is a data collection activity as it results in a collection of facts
and figures concerning how many, and how badly, houses are damaged on each street in a disaster
affected location. The Red Cross then performs information processing by aggregating the data to
provide valuable input information for several decisions that directly impact the flow of resources in
the disaster relief supply chain (e.g., whether to open more shelters, the predicted duration of relief
operations, how much food and water to bring in). In this quote, Information sharing occurs through
conference calls. The Red Cross communicates data collected about damage at specific sites, or
processed information about aggregate damage, or even its resource-related plans for opening
shelters, keeping them open, and providing food and water; in addition, the Red Cross can obtain
valuable data and information from other organizations that it can process to support future decisions.

Figure 2: Observed Information Flow Activities and their Impact on Resource Flows
We found many activities of collection, processing, and sharing that impacted resource flows. In the
following quote, a Red Cross senior director reflected on the difficulties of managing resources at the
Reliant Complex shelter and how impediments to the activity of sharing information ultimately
impacted their own inventory management efforts. Notice how the supplier organizations, in lieu of
continued information sharing, re-processed stale information about need when making decisions
concerning inter-organizational resource flow.
“There was a disconnect on resources cause you didn’t always have the right amount of
resources at the right time at the right place. […] Initially you didn’t have enough resources,
but then once the flow starts […] then that flow keeps coming in. […] We had truckloads of
cots that were brought into Houston that were […] never opened. (We) had to contract with
warehouses to take excess donated goods because we were overwhelmed. […] There
were trade-offs being made. You’re taking a lot of resources away from what you could be
doing with that money and manpower and you’re using it to manage donated goods. […] If
you don’t end up communicating your needs effectively then whoever’s sending you the
resources is going to continue sending you the resources and after a while you’re caught
saying ‘don’t send anymore!’” (Senior Director Emergency Services, American Red Cross)
Yet this overabundance of resources did not exist throughout organizations across the entire disaster
relief supply chain. The next excerpt discusses how most offices in a rural area of Louisiana had
insufficient resources to provide for relief client needs while the Red Cross shelters, after obtaining
communications capabilities, were overwhelmed.
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“I found (a) communications truck with technology. I knocked on the window, and he asked
if he could help anybody, and I said ‘hey, come with me!’ It was a full truck, full
communications, I had internet, I had telephone. It basically ran the base (of local Red
Cross) operations for several weeks. […] Most people couldn’t get through a phone system.
The lines were waiting at every office that you could think of. People were looking for
assistance. And then you had (Red Cross) shelters that got bombarded with assistance
because people just want to help, so there was too much clothes, too much food. It sounds
strange that our shelters had too much, but there was too much assistance there.”
(Community Recovery Manager, American Red Cross)
The two quotes above are among those that show the impact of information flows on the flow of
resources (see Figure 2). Both excerpts illustrate how impediments in the information flow left
organizations struggling to direct and receive appropriate resources. First, when locations
experiencing relief client demand were not known to suppliers, no resources were sent. After demand
locations were known, a lack of current information led suppliers to believe that they were helping to
satisfy additional downstream demand by continuing to send more resources that, in fact, were not
needed. In general, when the flow of information was impeded, resource flows created underserved
pockets of demand at several locations while others, such as the Red Cross shelters above, were
overburdened with inventory management. In the next subsection, we discuss in detail our findings
regarding information flow impediments.

4.2.

Information Flow Impediments

After analyzing the data, we found that eight theoretical categories of information flow impediments
emerged: (1) inaccessibility, (2) inconsistent data and information formats, (3) inadequate stream of
information, (4) low information priority, (5) source identification difficulty, (6) storage media
misalignment, (7) unreliability, and (8) unwillingness. Each of these impediments corresponds to what
qualitative researchers call an analytical generalization, which consists of inductively formulating
theoretical concepts or categories (Yin, 2002; Lee and Baskerville, 2003). Thus, these theoretical
categories are presented in the form of analytical generalizations and we provide a definition below
for each of these analytical generalizations along with relevant examples from our interviews. When
not evident within a quote, we also provide a summary discussion of the action strategies
organizations carried out in response to each impediment. We do not claim that this set of
impediments is exhaustive, as further research may expand the definitions or add more. Moreover,
we acknowledge that they may even overlap. Indeed, some of the episodes portrayed in this paper
could be used as examples for more than one information flow impediment. Due to the interpretive
nature of the study, however, they are vindicated, we argue, as they offer conceptual and explanatory
power. We depict the relationships between impediments and general reaction strategies in Figure 1.

(1) Inaccessibility
Inaccessibility refers to the inability to obtain data or information that is known or assumed to exist.
Often, we found this was due to physical constraints. A local defense contractor, for example, wanted
an initial damage assessment of its facilities. Unfortunately, with communication lines down, roads
inaccessible, and entire parishes closed off, accessing information about the status of its facilities
turned out to be challenging.
“We had no eyes or ears on the ground; we had no communication in or out.” (CIO of a
local defense contractor)
For this defense contractor, the inaccessibility of the facility via normal remote communications
methods led to use of an alternate means of collecting the information we desired. One of the firm’s
employees, a colonel in the Army Reserves, was able to inspect the damage visually and report back:
“(The colonel) said: I’ll go. I got a rucksack, I can last several days […] just get me down
there somehow. […] We send him down there and that night he called us with that satellite
phone. He told us what we are dealing with. The data center is gone, the walls are gone,
there are a few people around, it’s devastated, it’s even worse than the pictures on the
news.” (CIO of a local defense contractor)
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In another example, the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
(OHSEM) learned that some of the parishes in Louisiana had emptied their jails and put prisoners
onto buses heading toward Houston. OHSEM then attempted to obtain information from Louisiana’s
correctional facilities. The following passage describes the inability of Louisiana correctional facilities
to provide data about prison inmates evacuated on buses following the New Orleans levee breaks.
“They had no records of who they sent to us, because the computer systems all went under
water.” (Administrative Coordinator for the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management)
As a reactive strategy, people sought an alternate source of similar information.
“So, we had our DPS contact the Louisiana state troopers to […] get a copy of their sexual
offender list.” (Administrative Coordinator for the Harris County Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management)
Thus, inaccessibility can arise not only when emergency workers face situations for which their
information systems are unprepared, but also when they cannot access sources of information. In
such cases, emergency workers may seek alternate sources or revert to methods that pre-date the
modern age of information processing, such as sending a human messenger for physical inspection.

(2) Inconsistent Data and Information Formats
Inconsistent information and data formats exist when multiple sources of similar data or information
cannot be compared or aggregated due to having different dimensional or field definitions. This
impediment regularly occurred after an Inaccessibility impediment had been solved, but it also refers
to situations in which the received information differed greatly from other sources of related data. As
an illustration, consider how American Red Cross relief workers in Louisiana attempted to ascertain
shelter occupancy based on information from several different sources.
“The numbers were really a myth. You talk to emergency operations, the director of the
parish, and what he would tell you was what was requested. The numbers were very
different compared to what our staff would be coming in with.” (Community Recovery
Manager, American Red Cross)
Attempting to reconcile numbers based on different measurements proved difficult. For example,
when attempting to ascertain the number of relief clients that were currently residing at a shelter,
information about resource requests, registrations, inventory usage, and other sources was not
consistent. “Playing it safe” (i.e., aggregating these numbers by taking the highest one) was a
common strategy applied to ensure that adequate resources would be available no matter which
source was most accurate.
“So you basically took the combination of all the information resources and you would take
the highest number because you wanted to be safe.” (Community Recovery Manager,
American Red Cross)
Another example of inconsistent information appeared in the midst of Katrina relief efforts when
Hurricane Rita spurred an evacuation from the Houston area. Some media sources reported that
hundreds were dying of heat exhaustion on the evacuation routes.
“Because of (media reports), we mobilized various county and city resources to go up and
down the lines of cars handing out water. According to the Red Cross, all needs were being
met. The police were telling us ‘it’s hot but no one’s dying’. The medical services said they
transported 40 people.” (Administrative Coordinator, Harris County Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management)
Although the information was inconsistent, it provided indications to help determine that the media
reports of heat exhaustion deaths were untrue. Aggregating dissimilar information proved to be more
appropriate as a base for decision making than having no input information at all.
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(3) Inadequate Stream of Information (Shortage/Overload)
An inadequate stream of information occurs when there is too little or too much data or information
available to an organization. Organizations capable of dealing with large amounts of information, such
as Harris County OHSEM, generally desired more information so they could integrate it into their view
of the rapidly shifting environment. When asked how valuable additional information about demand
and supply/relief capacity would be, the Administrative Coordinator of the Harris County OHSEM
jokingly replied: “Yes!” Harris County OHSEM responded to a perceived shortage of information by
simply improvising based on whatever they did have. That is, they were able to continue their
operations by making assumptions and estimates that allowed them to remain flexible. It is important
to note that an inadequate information stream, especially too little information, can result from the
existence of the other information flow impediments, but it may also arise from the extreme
uncertainty and urgent responsiveness inherent in the disaster environment itself.
In contrast to too little information, the Red Cross had to deal with too much information—more
specifically with overwhelming amounts of data in the form of shelter registrations on paper. In
addition to being used for registration, these paper forms provided important data when trying to find
and reunite missing and separated family members.
“The Red Cross shelter registration process […] was tied completely to paper. […] At that
point there was so much paper data. […] Being able to track people–finding them–that was
a hard piece. We found out that as much effort as we put into shelter registration and being
able to find people, it is woefully inadequate for what is needed in a mass evacuation like a
Katrina evacuation.” (Senior Director Emergency Services, American Red Cross)
As the Red Cross encountered overwhelming quantities of paper registrations, they reacted by
putting more effort into finding missing family members. Unfortunately, due to the sheer volume of
registrations, they found the additional effort to still be inadequate.
The difference between having too much and too little information appeared to depend on the
function of the organization. Organizations attempting to allocate resources to many organizations,
such as Harris County OHSEM, often wanted more information, while organizations dealing directly
with relief clients, such as the Red Cross, often had difficulty managing the information they received.
The example of Harris County OHSEM points out the need for employees to be ready to make
decisions based on very little information, while the Red Cross example highlights the need to
integrate disjunctive data formats into automatable procedures when dealing with shelter registrations.

(4) Low Information Priority
Low information priority is the failure to place appropriate precedence on information flow activities.
Given the humanitarian imperative of the tasks necessary following disasters, the collecting,
processing, and sharing of information may not be a top priority for managers, workers, or volunteers.
For example, central authorities, such as Harris County OHSEM, did not receive enough
information—not only because of inaccessibility, but also because officers providing help could not
dedicate time to data collection activities. The following quote illustrates a common sentiment among
the front-line disaster relief providers who were often the only ones with access to important demand
data.
“It’s not that we don’t want to share (information), but finding the time. […] I do not have
time to share. Is it important to (help others) capture information or provide help?”
(Community Recovery Manager, American Red Cross)
In this case, low information priority resulted in inactivity with respect to collecting, processing, and
sharing information.
“For 15 days, there was no time. You were exhausted. It just didn’t happen.” (Community
Recovery Manager, American Red Cross)
In contrast, the local defense contractor continued information activities, but altered its priority on
normal information processes for decision making.
“It boiled down to making decisions quickly. Large corporations can easily find themselves
going into analysis paralysis in their normal operations. Most of that went out the window as
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we worked to solve problems at what we soon were calling ‘hurricane spee.d’” (Group
Director of IT Solutions at a local defense contractor)
Even relief clients themselves placed low priority on information activities.
“(Relief clients) don’t see the importance of leaving a trail of where they’ve been. Unless
they have relatives…” (Senior Director Emergency Services, Red Cross)
Overall, reactions to low information priority ranged from information inactivity to proceeding with
decisions based on substandard information.

(5) Source Identification Difficulty
Source identification difficulty occurs when an organization does not know where to obtain the data or
information that it wants. Source identification difficulty is similar to inaccessibility; however, while the
latter involves the absence of channels, the former refers to not knowing where the required
information is. An illustration of source identification difficulty is the experience of Interfaith Ministries
(IM) when working with several faith-based congregations that were eager to find out how they could
contribute to the disaster relief efforts.
“Nobody knew who to call, where to go. […] the underlying assumption in disaster
(planning) is that people know what their roles and responsibilities are; but a lot of people
will wait, and then (ask) ‘why did this not happen?’ ‘I was waiting for you to do it, and I didn’t
know I was responsible for it.’” (Manager, Office of Disaster Preparedness, Interfaith
Ministries)
Not knowing where to get the needed information led to an action strategy of inactivity. That is, since
the parties involved did not know where to get information about what their roles and responsibilities
were, they remained inactive while others were waiting for them to do something.
This type of information flow impediment can also be illustrated by the difficulty experienced when
locating or identifying relief clients. As many volunteer organizations rapidly transformed into shelters,
no formal documentation was kept about these events. As a result, the Red Cross continued to find
Katrina relief clients sheltered in smaller community churches that were not a part of the formal relief
efforts even a month after the disaster.
“We would find people sheltered even after Katrina had passed 4 or 5 weeks later that we
didn’t know about.” (Community Recovery Manager, American Red Cross)
As a reaction, the Red Cross initiated extra efforts to obtain data concerning the whereabouts of
sheltered relief clients.
“I actually took two trained volunteers that helped on a daily basis and I put them out in the
community with one of our response teams to go church to church […] to find out if there
are people sheltered in this community.” (Community Recovery Manager, American Red
Cross)
Thus, source identification difficulty refers not only to the need for collected information that already
exists, which may even be available in information systems, but also to the need for collecting new
information for the first time. This raises an interesting question regarding how an organization
experiencing source identification difficulty can even know whether the information it needs has
already been collected by another organization and whether it is accessible. The reactions to this type
of impediment involved waiting and the deployment of extra resources. Overall, we found that this
impediment rendered a deep sense of uneasiness among those working in the organizations.

(6) Storage Media Misalignment
Storage media misalignment occurs when characteristics of the chosen recording or storage media
inherently inhibit efficient information flow activities. For example, it could refer to the gathering of
information on paper, which makes it unsuitable for electronic processing. This occurs as the initial
data gathering takes place in the field at a time when formal computerized systems are typically not
available, or paper data collection is faster than various electronic means of data collection. Consider
the data collection problems that surfaced during and after registration in the Reliant Complex mega
shelters in Houston.
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“The problem is inputting the data is slower than writing. […] (For) almost all military
operations, the actual real time operation is done on paper because the technology can’t
keep up with us yet. Now, the technology is fabulous for tracking assets, the technology is
fabulous for tracking your actions for accountability, but when you’re in that decision making
mode, when you’re issuing those orders…technology is not there yet.” (Administrative
Coordinator for the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management)
At the same time, however, problems were encountered by the Red Cross as they processed
registrations on paper at the Reliant Center mega shelters. The following two discussions show that
although paper may be better for data collection activities, newer information technologies hold
important advantages when processing and sharing information.
“(The Red Cross) kept (taking shelter registrations on paper) and then they had to stack the
papers. ‘How many people ya’ll got’ was the question. ‘Well, we have this many on this
sheet. How many we got on this piece of paper?’” (Administrative Coordinator for the Harris
County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management)
The action strategy taken after the realization of storage media misalignment was to convert the
paper-based data storage to a computerized database.
“(Eventually,) we had volunteers with computers all over the city taking chunks of paper
trying to put all that data into computers. That was very laborious, trying to put all that into
the computer database.” (Senior Director Emergency Services, American Red Cross)
Other action strategies included expending more effort on handling the data each time it was needed
and, more commonly, simply not using the available data. Storage media misalignment is related to
low information priority, as the need to act makes relief workers register data on paper rather than
wait for electronic devices. Response strategies to this impediment included information inactivity and
dedicating extra resources to processing data. By information inactivity, we mean that the
organization decided to stop processing data. Overall, this information impediment suggests the need
for information systems that can easily capture data in electronic formats more suitable for processing
activities.

(7) Unreliability
Unreliability refers to an organization’s low level of confidence in data or information it possesses.
This not only refers to information organizations actually receive, but also to information they send.
Interfaith Ministries (IM), for example, in its intermediary role between government and faith-based
organizations, was approached by many congregations in hopes that it could provide the most current
and reliable information.
“We had a lot of people having us to be (their information resource), but we didn’t have the
database to really say I feel confident enough for you to go. […] And that ticked a lot of
people off, because you didn’t know for sure, knowing that it wasn’t reliable and timely.”
(Manager, Office of Disaster Preparedness, Interfaith Ministries)
Nevertheless, organizations often kept the most meaningful part of the information while still doubting
the details. This was a situation experienced by the Red Cross:
“All the data was self-reported, so there was no verification. You ask for identification, a
driver’s license or picture ID. It has an address and a picture so there’s some verification
there, but so many people came to shelters with no identification whatsoever. They had to
wade through water […] lots of people lost their wallets. […] (But the data) was good to a
point, because you knew that person survived the evacuation, they survived the disaster,
and they were at a Red Cross shelter at some point. So we knew who was alive.” (Senior
Director Emergency Services, American Red Cross)
Interfaith Ministries’ reaction to the unreliability of information was to discourage faith-based
organizations from getting involved if it was not clear they were needed. In this way, they simplified
their efforts by reducing the number of organizations involved. In contrast, the Red Cross simply
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accepted the unreliability of the data they possessed and used it wherever it could provide value.
Thus, unreliability is an information impediment that prevails across different organizations and refers
not to the accessibility, format, or amount of information, but to its quality. We found that this is
something organizations deal with simplifying and by keeping the most important meaning conveyed.

(8) Unwillingness
Unwillingness occurs when one organization decides not to transfer data or information to another
organization. This category is closely related to inaccessibility; however, the non-availability of
information does not depend on something physical as inaccessibility does, but rather on constraints
of regulatory law or even personal preference. Continuing a previous example, when Harris County
OHSEM was informed that parishes in Louisiana had emptied their jails onto buses that were heading
toward Houston, Harris County requested sexual offender lists from the State of Louisiana.
Unfortunately, state laws precluded this information from being shared.
“Well, it didn’t happen; state law. They couldn’t give (sexual offender lists) to anybody […]
It’s not like in Texas where you put their names and all up.” (Administrative Coordinator for
the Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management)
As a reactive strategy, Harris County OSHEM responded to this unwillingness, and more from the
American Red Cross, by obtaining the information without permission.
So, what we did is, we hacked into their system and downloaded the list. […] Now we
wanted to combine this information with the registration information that the Red Cross had
captured electronically already by that time. Well, the Red Cross told us we can’t get that
information. […] it is their policy, it said, at a national level. So no problem, we hacked their
system as well and did a quick cross reference.” (Administrative Coordinator for the Harris
County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management)
Another account from a spontaneous, unaffiliated volunteer illustrates the unwillingness of the Katrina
Housing Taskforce to release evacuee housing data.
“A lot of it came down to who you knew in terms of having access to certain kinds of
information. I called and asked for the list of housing developments they were moving
evacuees into and was told they couldn’t give it to me.” (Spontaneous Unaffiliated
Volunteer)
The individual then proceeded to gain the necessary permission by leveraging personal relationships.
Throughout our data analysis, reliance on personal relationships was a common action strategy in
response to the intervening condition of unwillingness.
“So I called (the Houston Mayor’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Housing), who I worked with
before, on his cell and he cleared the information release right away.” (Spontaneous
Unaffiliated Volunteer)
Clearly, this impediment touches upon aspects of regulation and even ethics. The actions taken by
relief officers show the desperation of the moment. It is an ethical dilemma whether to obey a
regulation that is thought to preserve individuals’ rights during regular times or to obtain the required
information to protect the lives and livelihoods of entire communities. In any case, this impediment
calls attention to the need for legislating flows of information throughout major disasters. It also shows
that the measures to be taken to guarantee information flows during disaster times transcend the
technical aspects of information systems.

5. Discussion
The ability of inter-organizational information flows to improve supply chain resource flow
performance is well-established in normal industries (Sahin and Robinson, 2002). In disaster times,
however, this linkage has not been adequately examined. Through this extreme case study analysis
of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, we found that supply chain information flows did improve resource
flows; however, the information flow was influenced by several impediments. Our examination
revealed that each of these impediments arose, at least in part, from some combination of the
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disaster relief supply chain characteristics that we described in the literature review section as urgent
responsiveness, extreme uncertainty, and short life-cycles. Thus, our findings confirm the themes
identified in extant literature (Beamon and Kotleba, 2006; Denning, 2006; Van Wassenhove 2006;
Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Ödzamar et al., 2004; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2004), while
empirically illustrating concrete instances of those themes.
Table 3 below provides a summary of our findings. While Column 2 provides a short definition of all
impediments identified in this study, Column 3 ties these findings to extant disaster literature. We
found that the underlying characteristics of the disaster situation (i.e., urgent responsiveness, extreme
uncertainty, and short life-cycles) were observed to be contributing factors. Column 4 summarizes the
information flow activities that we found to be adversely impacted by each impediment, while Column
5 lists the different reaction strategies that organizations adopted.
Overall, Columns 2, 3, and 5 represent a sequence consisting of “impediment, cause, and line of
action applied.” This sequence was key in our analysis, as it provided us with an anchor point during
the selective coding process. More specifically, it allowed us to infer a set of IS design principles as
shown in Column 6. Column 6 suggests certain characteristics of information systems that could
potentially support the strategies aimed at alleviating the impediments. Thus, Table 3 synthesizes our
main findings, both empirically and theoretically.
Each row of the table, with the combination of information flow impediment and its respective system
solution, represents a theoretical proposition that could be subjected to empirical testing either by
confirmatory studies or by action research. In other words, future research could test whether the
proposed impediments, in combination with each proposed design principle, represent a
comprehensive set that holds true across various organizations and disasters. Thus, each of the eight
rows in the table—by virtue of its hypothetical nature—represents what Lee and Baskerville (2003)
call a contribution to theory, which is one of the strengths of qualitative research.
The remainder of this section discusses in detail a set of design principles. The principles originate
from reflecting on how IS might alleviate the impact of information impediments of future disasters
and lead to an improved flow of resources throughout the disaster relief supply chain. These design
principles comprise four aspects.2
As a first design principle, a system supporting disaster relief objectives should be able to identify and
deal with both incongruent data points and data credibility issues. Storing factual data only, as most
traditional systems do, is not sufficient in unstable environments like those presented in disaster
situations. Traditional systems typically refuse to store incongruent data, as it might lead to
inconsistencies and unstable database states. Associating a congruence percentage as well as a
credibility value as an explicit attribute value to a data point would, therefore, be a simple and tangible
solution to address inconsistent and unreliable data. Another potential solution is to display all the
collected data, such as has been done in TweetNews, a new application that relates recent Twitter
messages to breaking Yahoo news stories (Gilbertson, 2009). Such an approach may help disaster
managers better understand the congruence and credibility of reports surrounding emerging issues.
As a second design principle inferred from our case study, we recommend a system that incorporates
geospatial applications — not only to monitor the disaster area (especially if the disaster area is
inaccessible), but also to provide useful data about relief zones and reconstruction areas. Existing
applications include Weather.com and Google Earth. Continuing the example above, a system
component seems feasible that links the geographical layout of a sheltering location with data about
its potential capacities.
As a third design principle, a system capturing audio, video, or textual information should do so with
2

We should clarify here that these principles are not specifically related to design science (for a detailed discussion in
this area in IS see for example: Hevner et. al., 2004; Iivari, 2002; van Aken, 2007). The principles presented here aim
at guiding IS designers.
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the least amount of human interference possible while improving the technical conversion between
data nature and data capture. For example, an application seems feasible that automatically converts
spoken words during an interview into a textual transcript format that can be stored electronically; or a
video capturing application that can easily be linked and stored with the geospatial component
mentioned earlier. At present, the misalignment between the nature of the data and the way it is
stored results in inefficiencies and low motivation to capture data at all. It should be noted that there
exist several technologies for performing electronic data collection in various formats; however, failed
and intermittent infrastructures (Larson et al., 2006), as well as the lack of wide-spread behavioral
adoption of technology (Perry, 2007), has thus far made it difficult to leverage them in the wake of
disasters.
As a fourth design principle, we suggest that future systems support a social network component.
Social network systems, such as Xing or LinkedIn, provide users the ability to store their personal
profile (including their title, role, and contact information), paired with a linked list of persons they
know. A disaster preparedness network would not only visualize the formal network of people
activated in disasters, but also a list of informal contacts that individuals possess from other contexts.
In disaster times, the combination of formal and informal networks may contain valuable information
and resources that can be leveraged to find appropriate people faster which, in turn, may result in
speeding up the decision-making processes or in finding new and non-traditional solutions.
We do not claim that these design principles are comprehensive. After all, very basic
recommendations, such as ensuring a system’s reliability, speed, or backup, are already essential
components of existing disaster management efforts. Nonetheless, we believe our case study has
identified pieces beyond the existing recommendations that system designers might find worthwhile
to consider for future systems that support disaster relief supply chain decision makers.
In addition to the design principles, we also recommend training employees to use improvisation
when encountering unexpected situations. The complexity of disaster relief supply chains makes it
almost impossible to plan for the unexpected situations that typically arise. In this sense, the
impediments that we have identified can be the basis of training aimed at improvising solutions to
information flow challenges following disasters (Weick, 1993 and 1998). Creatively finding ways to
mitigate their impact throughout the disaster relief supply chain will improve the flow of information
and beneficially impact the corresponding resource flow throughout the system-wide effort. As several
action strategies from our case study illustrate, improvisations were common in attempts to solve
many of the information flow problems encountered during Katrina relief efforts. The phenomenon of
improvisation has been amply studied in the management literature (see for example Crossan, 1998;
Meyer, 1998; Meyer et al., 1998; Weick, 1993; Weick, 1998) and also in the IS literature (see for
example Ciborra, 1999; Junglas and Ives, 2007; Orlikowski, 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman, 1997;
Silva, 2002). However, these works have not concentrated on improvisations for the managing of
information flows and their relation to supply chain during a disaster.

6. Contributions and Implications
Contributions of our research are many-fold. First, we have identified classes of problems related to
information flows that developers should address when designing information systems to support
disaster relief supply chains. We believe this is a significant contribution given, as mentioned above,
the sheer complexity and chaotic nature of managing information flows in post-disaster environments.
Second, we have presented a concrete instance of activities within a disaster relief supply chain. That
is, our findings lend additional empirical validity to previously identified characteristics inherent to
disaster relief supply chain environments. Third, the impediments we found extend the supply chain
theory that relates information flows and resource flows to a wider context (i.e., disaster relief). Our
research and analysis affirm that normal industries’ long-established relationship between information
flow and resource flow also extends into disaster relief scenarios. Moreover, our identification and
categorization of information flow impediments provides new insights into potential underlying
reasons why adequate performance in disaster relief efforts has remained so difficult to achieve.
Finally, we have proposed a set of general principles that may guide IS design for supporting
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information flows during disasters.
The managerial implications of our findings offer additional value. Practitioners wishing to improve the
overall system performance of disaster relief supply chains will want to consider the potential impact
of the identified impediments when planning and mobilizing inter-organizational disaster relief efforts.
Disaster relief planners will also want to encourage organizations to maintain capabilities for
improvising responses to these identified impediments. Over-reliance on information systems
designed for normal environments may lead to organizations being ill-prepared for operating in nonroutine disaster relief environments. There may also be merit in investigating innovative technological
methods—such as the ones proposed here—for responding to these impediments within the postdisaster context from which they arise. Such mechanisms that improve the flow of information and
resources in these extreme supply chains might yield insights on how to improve inter-organizational
efforts in normal industries; especially those industries that continue to experience increasing
uncertainty, shorter life-cycles, and urgent responsiveness.

7. Limitations
Due to the magnitude of the disaster and the dramatic impact that Katrina has had on even the most
fundamental elements of existence, choosing an appropriate sample set was challenging. We
conducted interviews across a wide variety of profit and non-profit organizations, as well as individual
volunteers that were not affiliated with any organization. We acknowledge that this sample might not
be comprehensive—after all, Katrina displaced more than 780,000 people within a radius of 200 miles,
and more than 250,000 people were at least temporarily out of work. Therefore, capturing information
from the plethora of organizations involved was impractical. We also acknowledge that our sample
might under-represent individuals and over-represent organizations. When interviewing individuals,
we soon realized that each individual was serving it at least one role affiliated with at least one
organization (e.g., as an employee, volunteer relief worker, donor). We rarely encountered individuals
who were independent and most of them simultaneously held more than one role. Despite these
limitations, however, we feel that this study provides value, as it showcases the information
impediments experienced from a representative set of perspectives in a very salient form.

8. Conclusion
This extreme case study of disaster relief has revealed issues that may otherwise have gone
unobserved. Often, retrospective analyses of disaster relief are either avoided or softened because
people do not want to assign blame. Yet identifying impediments to avoid the same pitfalls in the
future is vital. Our research has taken an initial step and provided a set of impediment categories that
can either be subjected to empiric testing or serve as design considerations for information systems.
Future research can test whether the proposed impediments in combination with the proposed design
guidelines represent a comprehensive set and whether they hold across other types of involved
organizations. Also, we had the opportunity to study an extreme case of a natural disaster, but the
generalization of our findings to other domains, such as pandemics, terrorism, or even non-disaster
efforts, remains untested (Lee and Baskerville, 2003).
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Appendix– Organizational Description of Interview Partners
The American Red Cross
Although the Red Cross is not a government agency, it is chartered by the U.S. government to
provide emergency services following disasters. The Red Cross is expected to provide shelter, food,
health and mental health services to address basic human needs. In addition, it feeds emergency
workers, handles inquiries from concerned family members outside the disaster area, provides blood
products to disaster victims, and helps those affected by disasters to access other available
resources (American Red Cross, 2006). One of the core missions of the Red Cross is to provide
assistance to individuals and families affected by disaster, enabling them to resume their normal daily
activities independently. Hurricane Katrina was the biggest disaster in the history of the Red Cross,
hosting 40,000 people in 200 shelters nationwide (American Red Cross, 2006).

Interfaith Ministries (IM) for Greater Houston
Interfaith Ministries (IM) for Greater Houston area is a non-profit social service agency that serves as
an intermediary between governmental agencies (including the city, county, state and federal level)
and local faith-based organizations. The spectrum of religious congregations active with Interfaith
Ministries includes organizations affiliated with Christianity, Judaism, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, and other
faith traditions. Interfaith Ministry’s tri-fold mission is to assist refugees with resettlement, provide daily
meals for home-bound individuals, and encourage disaster preparedness in their affiliated faith
communities. During Katrina, Interfaith Ministries was involved in feeding evacuees from Louisiana
that were transported to Houston by buses.

The University of New Orleans (UNO)
UNO is a major urban university within the city limits of New Orleans. Prior to Katrina, it had
approximately 17,000 students. Afterwards, enrollment declined considerably and it remained far from
its pre-disaster status in 2008. Even 18 months later, the university remained only partially operable
while administration and staff continue fighting for its survival.
Following Katrina, a group of volunteers consisting of staff and faculty established a control center on
the Baton Rouge campus in an attempt to get the university IT system up and running again by
resurrecting basic functions, such as email and Internet service. In addition, an ad-hoc phone bank
was implemented and manned with volunteers. Locating, contacting, and disseminating information to
university employees and students was of primary importance as the semester had just started.

Defense contractor in the Gulf Coast Area
The local defense contractor (who remains anonymous) provides aerospace and defense systems to
the U.S. as well as global customers. Their spectrum of business lines ranges from designing to
integrating and manufacturing defense electronics, advanced aircraft, shipbuilding, and space
technology. Approximately 20,000 employees worked, and now work again, in three large facilities in
the Gulf area: one in Pascagoula, Mississippi, a smaller facility in neighboring Gulfport, and one
facility in New Orleans.
Prior to Katrina, the organization took its usual precautionary measures based on its business
continuity plan. It evacuated employees and secured its facilities and IT functions. However, when
Katrina hit with full force, all three facilities were severely impacted and mostly inoperable. Initiatives
to restore the facilities were quickly overshadowed by the restoration of employee families instead.

Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (OHSEM)
The Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (OHSEM) in Texas is
responsible for emergency management planning and ensuring continuity of social services
throughout Harris County and the Greater Houston Area. It maintains and supervises the regional
EOC that helps coordinate all local support agencies by preparing and distributing disaster
information while working with federal, state, and local authorities.
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Following Katrina, Harris County took on an estimated 250,000 evacuees. When the Superdome in
New Orleans became uninhabitable, evacuees were transported by buses to the George R. Brown
Convention Center in downtown Houston as well as the Reliant Complex, including the Astrodome.
Government agencies from both the city and county took on the administration of these
unprecedented mega-shelters and worked in conjunction with the American Red Cross, which
managed sheltering operations. At its peak, 24,300 evacuees were staying at the Reliant Complex
and 2,800 at the George R. Brown Convention Center downtown (Harris County Joint Information
Center, 2006).
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